Across an Angry Sea

Comments on Delves Across the Angry Sea

Delves describes in often fine prose the beauty and the awfulness of combat, in frozen and little known precincts of the South Atlantic. Why risk lives and equipment in a chancy attempt to regain an almost uninhabitable piece of ice and stone, South Georgia, from a third rate military and diplomatic power—Argentina? Margaret Thatcher, knowing little about war, risked her brave boys and spent billions of pounds on chunks of rock and ice that few valued at tuppence. US Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State concluded, in despair, that if the UK lost this petty conflict, the alliance between the United States and Great Britain and the agreements among both our NATO allies might suffer irrevocable wrents. The South Georgia affair was a political event colored by the dramatic use of small military units. The electorate was cowed into the notion that Britain retained the upper hand and that Argentinas cessation of the war was close at hand. They needed action.
Delves work shows bravery, clumsiness, hubris and wastage at their most frantic. Mistakes too. No Argentine subs thwarted HMS Antrim or the landing parties. Most stayed at home. Only three Argentine torpedoes are known to have been fired. None hit. SAS raid on Pebble Island, a site thought erroneously to be a major Argentine Air Force facility offers a template for what followed. The target was a squadron of Pucara attack planes. They had been transferred from their base at Goose Green for reasons of safety.
The Pucara was a failed military weapon. After two Pucaras went nose into the mud on takeoff from Goose Green the second pilot was discarded to lessen weight, as were the principal weaponry and half the fuel load. The remaining pilot navigated, lined up targets, dropped the bomb and if unwounded and alive flew home alone. The squadrons pilots were nearly unanimous in declining to fly combat missions. A few flew. Twelve hundred of the planes maintenance men and their tools were left at Goose Green. The probability of an attack on British troops or ships was close to zero. Delves had selected the planes as a ripe military target. No defense was expected and none was offered. Delves small and capable raiding force destroyed all the grounded planes. During the forces exfiltration two senior sergeants decided to resolve their simmering dispute the old-fashioned way. After inflicting damage on each other they rejoined their unit showing if nothing else that Delves D Squadron was not a happy Band of Brothers.
Here begins the back story that foretells the action on South Georgia. Both the Wets in Thatchers cabinet and a little informed electorate wanted action followed by a negotiated settlement. Nott the UK Minister of Defense and Pym the Foreign Secretary put their faith in Occams Razor. South Georgia was the blade. The electorate wanted action. General Peter de la Billiere the head of British Special Forces hung about Cabinet Offices and imposed the belief on whomever he could find that his troops could, unaided by the heavy battalions, prick the Argentines into quitting. South Georgia had no heavy guns, anti-air defense, lines of defense or economic value. It had no strategic value to either belligerent. Yet the Cabinet, advised or perhaps badgered by General de la Billiere took little convincing. A mission to retake South Georgia was put underway on April 7th, 1982.
Delves omitted from his narrative that he, his immediate boss LtCol. Mike Rose based on Ascension Island and the SAS commander in Britain used the US TACSAT that provided excellent communications among them. It had the further purpose of evading the established chain of command that spread from Northwood the HQ for the Falklands effort to all units under their purview. General De La Billiere (DLB)and Rose could offer suggestions and commands to Delves before, during and after the operation. This doubling of communications cast doubt on whose the raid was. Who owned it: conventional forces or the SAS; Northwood via Sheridan or De la Billiere via the American donated TACSAT.
Delves narrative is replete with hubristic sometimes silly statements. We assumed the Americans had to be listening on our TACSAT conferences p 16. Wrong. Relatively junior officers chatter was of no interest.
As the war progressed the US showedsupport. P. 16 Two weeks before Argentina invaded the Falklands US SecNav John Lehman had an inkling that war was about to begin. He sent two small tankers of oil to Ascension Island for the British navy to refuel. That is before the UK knew that war was on. The US government did not wait to help the UK
He was the designated land force commander and Brian Young our boss. P. 26. Young CO of HMS Antrim was Boss until the troops landed. From that moment Sheridan was the commander of all British forces on South Georgia.
Delves inserted his men on 21 April1982
P. 31 Should news of our moves seep out P. 34 We had to get eyes on the target. P. 28 close in recce. The British Antarctic Survey had five huts scattered about South Georgia inhabited by their scientists who monitored the island closely. They sent their reports en clair to their Cambridge HQ, Dr. Richard Laws, who passed them to Rear Admiral Tony Wheatly RN at Northwood. None of their reports showed Argentine military movement. P. 37 We should approach the target with utmost caution..could take four to five days to complete the task. Delves writes as though planning the Normandy invasion. It was not. Napoleon did not await Wellington on South Georgia.
Little known from the narrative in Delves book is that prior to the landing Sheridan and Lt.Col. Keith Eve RA had drawn up a meticulous fire plan for HMS Antrims guns to destroy whatever troops and their positions lay ashore. The Fire Plan (The reviewer has a copy) was war college perfect and would demoralize any soldier on the wrong end. It worked. No resistance was offered. Major Sheridan landed his own small Head Quarters group and M Company Group from 42 Commando, adequate to put paid to any chilled-out Argentines. The RM force, ably commanded and knowing their goals was the singular combat British force on the ground on South Georgia. Delves valiant men were not.

The reader should know that the Soviets out up at least six geo-centric satellites over the Falkland Islands and South Georgia. The US SecDef Cap Weinberger diverted, at great cost six American satellites from their normal missions in order to monitor closely activities of both Argentina and the UK and anyone else who might show curiosity about this peculiar affair. The take from these missions was sent promptly to the UK. This reviewer ran, with a small team, an SR-71 mission that made two passes over the Falklands and South Georgia. The results of this mission were also delivered to the UK. Delves writes that he set out on the mission with almost no ground knowledge. He had all the ground data he needed had he looked or listened. So did the rest of the military world.
Delves insistence that a covert patrol be inserted atop Fortuna Glacier was opposed by many of HMS Endurances crew who had foot on the ground experience atop the glacier. Sheridan a former RM Olympic team member and others with similar experience opposed the landing claiming that the crevasses were large enough to prevent the SAS from pulling their pulks safely. BAS Peter Stark had lived on the island for two years steadfastly opposed landing on Fortuna. Delves disagreed. SAS troops landed by helicopter. In the event no lives were lost, but the SAS landing party, marooned for many hours in awful weather had to extracted from the glacier at great risk, the loss of their equipment and the destruction of two badly needed and borrowed helicopters. The heroic rescue of Delves men, approached disaster; the helo pilots performance was extraordinary. The survivors of this misfortune were rescued from Fortuna Glacier and recovered from frostbite and other annoyances over the next few days. Delves underestimation of the terrible weather and poor judgement was foreseen by many aboard the HMS Antrim and gave the Wets in London talking points sufficient to pause the war. Yet good advice and hard data went unheeded by Delves and his superiors.
This failed mission had reverberations. First, Argentina knew that combat seemed likely. Second the destruction of two helicopters strained the logistic efforts of the ground effort on East Falkands.
Delves devotes many words to the baggage his unit carried south. On his Boat Troops list were outboard motors that had failed in previous exercises. In his reconnaissance of Stromness three of same five engines failed, the men rescued after great and hazardous effort. Why bring faulty gear to war when it had been shown regularly to fail? A few marines scanned Delves Mountain troops climbing gear. It was found to be standard army issue. Why ordinary equipment for elite troops?
Delves insertion of D Squadron onto South Georgia had taken place on 21 April 1982. For all the disputes, planning, lack of sleep and horrid weather no battle ever ensued. Delves, men leap frogged over the Royal Marines to be the first to enter and capture Grytviken, South Georgias main village and its contents. On the way they fired two Milan ani-tank missiles at presumed military targets. No tanks existed on the island. Delves men did hit and kill two elephant seals. Delves awkwardness continued. Later during the siege of Port Stanley Delves was tasked with reconnaissance of MT. Kent prior to Lt.Col. Nick Vaux brilliantly prepared and executed plan for taking that strategic object. Vaux has written publicly that he never received the needed data from Delves.
War casts strange shadows. During the war an ill connected fuel hose from a shore side trunk to HMS Plymouth spewed fuel over this reviewers crisp white uniform and burned his right leg. Never sent HMG a bill. David J. Kenney

An interesting read from the SF perspective of the Falklands campaign. While lacking in grit in places it gave good insight into the planning and considerations faced by a combat leader.

Loved it. He really takes you into the action and especially the physical environment- the sub-antarctic temperatures, ferocious storms and terrifying seas. I have read many books on the FW but most have been potted histories. This book gives you a real sense for the difficult dilemmas inherent in leading a fighting force 8000 mimes from home – and at the tip of the spear. Powerful stuff.

One of the best first-hand accounts of the Falklands War that I’ve read. Highly recommended.

First-Hand Officer’s account of the retaking of Stanley. Good dry humour and loved reading it. I WAS after something a bit more ‘gritty’ and am still looking for a book that was written from a foot-soldier’s perspective.

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